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AidWatch 2026

Europe's Changing International Cooperation: What ODA Trends Reveal

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Since 2005, CONCORD's AidWatch reports have provided information, analysis, and recommendations on the quantity and quality of aid provided by the EU and its Member States. Through the AidWatch initiative, CONCORD's members hold EU decision-makers to account on their Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitments, including the longstanding target of allocating 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) to ODA. This is achieved through advocacy, research and media activities on a wide range of aid-related issues throughout the year.

WHAT DO WE DO TO ACHIEVE TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE?

Engage **Challenge** **Innovate** **Evolve**

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ADA	Austrian Development Agency
AECID	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CPA	Country Programmable Aid
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CSO(s)	Civil Society Organisation(s)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DCD	Development Co-operation Directorate (of the OECD)
EC	European Commission
ECA(s)	Export Credit Agency/Agencies
EU	European Union
EU MS	European Union Member States
EUR	Euro
FCA(s)	Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries
FEDES	Spanish Sustainable Development Fund
GNI	Gross National Income
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
IDRC	In-Donor Refugee Costs
LDC(s)	Least Developed Countries
LLD	Locally Led Development
NCQG	New Collective Quantified Goal
NGDO(s)	Non Governmental Development Organisations
NGO(s)	Non Governmental Organisations
MS	Member States
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCSD	Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development
PPP	Public Private Partnerships
PSI(s)	Private Sector Instrument(s)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TOSSD	Total Official Support for Sustainable Development

Contents

1. Context: a chance to renew global solidarity and make every euro count

Official Development Assistance (ODA) is an important expression of global solidarity. ***"55% of people worldwide believe their country should cooperate on global challenges even if it means compromising on national interests".***[1]

Despite the calls for more solidarity, **EU ODA is declining sharply,** with historic cuts from both EU Member States (MS) and EU Institutions. Over the past 7 years only three to four EU MS have met the 0.7% target, while countries like Belgium, Germany, France, Sweden and the Netherlands has announced further cuts.[2] These cuts are already affecting people in Majority World countries[3], and could have **negative consequences in the EU.**[4] At the same time, the scope of what counts as ODA continues to broaden. Our research found that in 2025, **22% of reported EU ODA was inflated,** which means that **more than one in five euro counted as ODA did not reach Majority World countries.**[5] As a result, **the actual amounts of public resources available for poverty and inequalities reduction are lower** than the official figures. There are also two other ways in which the **MS and EU Institutions are diluting ODA added value:**

→ **ODA is being more openly used to achieve mutual benefit and advance strategic EU and MS interests,** such as migration management, economic security, geopolitical influence and private investment mobilisation.[6] This approach risks subordinating core development objectives to broader strategic agendas, shifting decision-making away from Majority World countries' priorities and reducing the capacity of ODA to address poverty, inequalities and humanitarian needs.[7]

→ **EU ODA is concentrated in a few countries,** with Ukraine absorbing an exceptionally large share. In 2025, EU Institutions disbursed 65.2% more to Ukraine than in 2024. This is crowding out support for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries (FCAs).[8]

This policy brief aims to **give a preliminary assessment of the quality and quantity of EU ODA in 2025** and **suggests recommendations** to refocus ODA towards its original purpose: the economic development and welfare of Majority World countries and poverty and inequality reduction.

1 See FPIF (2026), Around the world, global solidarity and cooperation are remarkably popular.

2 See OECD (2026), ODA projections for 2026 and the near-term, June 2026.

3 While the term "Majority World" is not a classification used by the OECD DAC, UN statistical system, or EU institutions, CONCORD has decided to use this term instead of partner countries or Global South countries to avoid terminology that frames them primarily through a deficit, wealth or dependency lens.

4 The suspension of refugee recognition in Uganda, for example, could fuel refugee flows to Europe. See Uganda stops granting refugee status for Eritreans, Somalis and Ethiopians, The Guardian, 4 December 2025.

5 See AidWatch Report 2025 and previous editions.

6 See Bahí, A., R. Dom, N. Poitiers and C. Reverdy (2026), Between values and interests: drivers of European Union aid, Working Paper 13/2026, Bruegel, available at https://doi.org/10.64153/JXET9395.

7 The OECD DAC Peer Review of the EU (2025) highlights the challenge of balancing the EU's growing focus on geopolitical and strategic interests with poverty reduction and human development objectives. Bruegel's 2026 Working Paper 13/2026 op.cit. similarly finds that, while EU aid remains poverty-focused, foreign policy considerations are becoming increasingly influential in shaping EU development cooperation.

8 See OECD DAC (2026), Preliminary April Data, p. 3.

2. EU Member States and EU Institutions ODA falls to its lowest in years

Between 2024 and 2025, EU ODA decreased by 11.4% in real terms.[9] Cuts spread across most MS were the main driver of the decline. In previous years support from the EU Institutions helped to offset cuts from MS, but this was no longer the case in 2025.[10] **Besides, in spite of giving 47% of global ODA, neither EU Institutions nor MS can credibly claim global leadership on sustainable development while cutting their ODA.**[11]

MS have decreased their ODA steadily since the 2022 peak, which was influenced by exceptional factors such as a higher reporting of in-donor refugee costs (IDRC).[12] **In 2025, trends varied across MS,** with some implementing deep cuts (Ireland, Germany and Belgium) and Six Increasing ODA (Sweden, Hungary, Spain, Denmark, Luxembourg and Italy). In 2025, **EU Institutions' ODA fell by 13.8% compared to 2024 levels,** the biggest decline in a decade.[13]

Chart 1. The evolution of EU ODA allocations (2018–2025, grant equivalent, EUR million, constant)



Sources: Authors based on OECD data explorer; preliminary ODA 2026.

9 EU ODA refers to ODA from EU Institutions and EU MS combined. EU MS always refers to EU DAC and non-DAC countries unless stated otherwise. Currently the EU Institutions and twenty-three (23) EU MS are also DAC members.

10 This analysis is based on the preliminary data published by the OECD DAC on 9 April 2026 as well as a data set provided by the OECD's DCD Secretariat at the end of April, which both contain a high proportion of estimates.

11 See OECD DAC (2025), preliminary figures.

12 For further details see analysis of IDRC at 3.3 below.

13 See OECD, Modernising official development assistance (ODA), OECD.

ODA as a share of Gross National Income (GNI) dropped from 0.47% in 2024 to 0.42% in 2025. **This is the third consecutive decrease since the 2022 peak,** reaching its lowest point since 2018.

Only **Luxembourg, Sweden and Denmark met or exceeded the 0.7% target in 2025.**[14] Most MS remained well below 0.3% with Czechia, Bulgaria, Greece, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania even below 0.15%. Only six countries increased their ratio (Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden).[15]

Chart 2. ODA/GNI ratio for EU MS 2025



Source: Authors, based on OECD data explorer; preliminary ODA 2026

14 Together with Norway, these were the only four DAC members to achieve the target.

15 In some of them, however, this was to a large extent due to technical issues (such as reporting a large multi-year credit to the Green Climate Fund in Sweden) or increasing in-donor refugee costs in Spain.

3. Inflated ODA reported by EU MS and Institutions

Glossary: How do EU MS weaken ODA integrity?

For further details on what these different costs entail, please consult the AidWatch 2025 report, pages 29 – 50

→ **In-donor refugee costs (IDRC) do not primarily serve a development objective and are driven by domestic refugee inflows rather than development priorities.**

→ **Imputed student costs have a development rationale that is often difficult to demonstrate with a consequently limited development impact.**

→ **Private sector instruments (PSIs) are non-concessional, meaning not provided on favourable terms. This makes them misaligned with ODA's core purpose of providing public finance at better terms than the market.**

→ **Debt relief can involve double-counting, increasing ODA budgets without generating new financial resources for Majority World countries.**

→ **ODA loans calculations rely on rates that overstate the real donor effort involved. As a result, reported ODA can exceed the real amount of finance transferred to Majority World countries.**

3.1 The scale of ODA inflation: as ODA shrinks, too little goes to tackling poverty and inequalities

EU Member States

In 2025, **more than one fifth of EU ODA did not meet the criteria to qualify as ODA as it lacked a clear development objective and/or did not reach Majority World countries.** Inflated ODA from MS amounted to EUR 16.5 billion, **representing 22% of their total ODA.** This share has slightly increased from 2024 (21%), even despite a decrease in IDRC and further cuts to bilateral programmes. **The share of inflated ODA from MS remains far above levels before the war in Ukraine in 2022,** when it typically fluctuated between 10% and 15%.

IDRC continues to dominate inflated ODA. **Imputed student costs** are expected to remain the second-largest inflated component (approximately 20% of the total).[16] **Private Sector Instruments (PSI) ODA and debt relief both grew dramatically.** PSI ODA increased from EUR 1.0 billion in 2024 to EUR 1.4 billion in 2025, and debt relief rose from EUR 147 million to EUR 278 million. **ODA loans'** inflated share is expected to remain unchanged, at around EUR 1.1 billion.[17]

Among EU MS, **Ireland once again had the highest inflation rate (30.4%) and was followed by Germany (29.0%), Latvia (26.2%), Poland (24.8%) and Austria (24.7%).**

16 Data for imputed student costs are not yet available in the April preliminary report, therefore data from 2024 were carried over.

17 Data for inflated ODA loans are not yet available in the April preliminary report, therefore data from 2023/24 were carried over.

Chart 3. Breakdown of inflated and non-inflated ODA from EU MS (2025, EUR million, constant)



Note: Values are rounded to the nearest EUR million.
The 2025 figure for inflated ODA loans is carried over from the 2023/2024 estimates.

Source: calculations based on uploaded master pivot constant dataset and dataset provided by OECD DCD Secretariat

Chart 4. Total inflated ODA and breakdown per EU MS (2025)



Sources: Authors based on AidWatch report 2025; OECD data explorer; DCD data set preliminary ODA 2026

EU Institutions

Unlike MS, **EU Institutions report very limited amounts of inflated ODA, a practice that should continue.** From 2018–2025, the share generally represented less than 0.3% of their total ODA. The challenge for EU Institutions is whether ODA is prioritised to countries that can most benefit from it such as LDCs and FCAs. Indeed, **only 10.5% of EU Institutions' gross bilateral ODA reached LDCs in 2024**. The largest share went to lower middle-income countries, raising c**oncerns about the balance between strategic priorities and the poverty and inequalities-focused objectives set in EU Treaties**.[18] This concern is amplified by the growing emphasis on financial instruments under the EU's Global Gateway strategy, which increasingly links development finance to economic and geostrategic interests.

3.2 Private Sector Instruments: a rising component of EU ODA

PSI ODA reported by EU MS increased **from EUR 996 million in 2023 to EUR 1.4 billion in 2025. Despite still accounting for a relatively small share of total MS ODA,[19] this share rose steadily from 1.3% in 2023 to 1.5% in 2024 and 2.2% in 2025.** While cuts to ODA grants continue, the growing use of PSI reflects the increasing policy emphasis on mobilising private finance for sustainable development, reinforcing the need to **ensure that instruments such as guarantees and loans complement, rather than replace, grant-based ODA.** This is especially relevant for LDCs and FCAs, where grants are more appropriate for poverty reduction and more aligned with human development objectives than loans.[20]

Finland, Germany, France, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark reported the largest PSIs volumes in 2025. Germany ranked first after more than doubling its PSIs, while France increased its reported volumes by around 32% and Finland nearly doubled its amounts. Austria and Sweden continued to report relatively large PSI volumes.

As a share of total ODA, the highest shares were reported by Finland (6.0%), the UK (4.4%), Austria (4.0%), Sweden (3.1%) and Denmark (2.6%).

Chart 5. PSI share for some EU MS and the UK (2023 - 2025)



Source: authors, all data from OECD DAC Explorer / CRS. PSI data are available from 2018 onwards, but comparability is limited due to changes in DAC rules introduced for 2023 ODA reporting

18 See OECD DAC (2026), Development Co-operation Profile: European Union Institutions; OECD DAC (2024), ODA final figures.

19 In addition, disbursement-based data used for measurement against the 0.7% target will likely show a potential increase of PSI shares in DAC members' ODA with a certain delay.

20 See CONCORD (2026), Rounding out the EU's Global Gateway: 360 degrees for human development, policy brief, June 2026.

3.3 In-donor refugee costs: a smaller decline than the scale of EU ODA cuts

IDRC remained the largest source of inflated ODA among EU MS in 2025, despite falling by 22.6% to EUR 10.3 billion. Even after this decline, IDRC remained above levels reported before the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022. In 2025, almost **one in seven euro reported as ODA by MS was still spent on refugee-related costs within MS rather than reaching Majority World countries.**[21]

Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Luxembourg,[22] **Romania and Slovakia reported zero, low or near-zero** IDRC. While high volumes of IDRC are often encountered in countries with large numbers of asylum applications, such as in Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Greece, the correlation was not uniform in 2025. **EU MS with similar numbers of asylum applications often report different levels of IDRC, reflecting how national accounting practices and budgetary arrangements influence ODA figures.**

Chart 6. In-donor refugee costs as a percentage of ODA for EU MS (2013[21], 2018 - 2025)



Sources: Authors based on AidWatch report 2025; OECD data explorer; DCD data set preliminary ODA 2026

21 2013 has been included as a reference year to show longer term trends on the reporting of IDRC.

22 See Luxembourg, and the chapter on good practice below.

3.4 Imputed student costs : ODA shaped by domestic education expenditure

Imputed student costs **accounted for 3.9% of total MS ODA in 2025.** In 2025, **Germany reported EUR 2.19 billion (65% of MS total), followed by France with EUR 826 million (24%), Austria EUR 223 million (7%) and Poland EUR 139 million (4%).** Imputed student costs are counted as ODA even though the expenditure is made in the EU instead of in Majority World countries. For example, Germany reports the imputed costs of students coming from China to study at German universities as ODA, **even though Germany does not have a bilateral development cooperation programme with China**.

3.5 Debt relief : a temporary boost to ODA with limited resources behind

Debt relief remained a relatively small but highly volatile component of EU MS' reported ODA between 2018 and 2025, accounting for 0.37% of total ODA in 2025. France accounted for almost 70% of all EU debt relief reported in 2025. The increase to EUR 318 million in 2025 is significant not because of its size, but because it illustrates how debt relief can increase reported ODA without representing an equivalent increase in new development finance for Majority World countries.

Chart 7. Imputed student costs for EU MS (2018-2025, EUR million current)



Source: authors, DAC Secretariat file 4 September 2025 with CRS and DAC1 data sets and from OECD DAC Explorer / CRS, DAC Press Release DCD (2025)6.

Chart 8. Debt relief by EU MS (2018-2025, EUR million, current)



Source: authors, DAC Secretariat file 4 September 2025 with CRS and DAC1 data sets and from OECD DAC Explorer / CRS, DAC Press Release

3.6 Inflated ODA loans

Inflated ODA reported from loans remained a relatively limited but still relevant component. After rising sharply in 2020, the share remained elevated in 2021 and 2022 before declining significantly from 2023 onwards. Since then, ODA loans have stabilised at over EUR 1 billion annually, **representing less than 1% of total MS ODA in 2025**. While the amounts are not as high when compared to other forms of inflated ODA, the methodology used to report loans can still overstate MS effort, making reported ODA appear higher than the actual level of resources provided to Majority World countries.

Chart 9. Inflated ODA reported from loans by EU MS (2018-2025, EUR million, current)



Source: authors, DAC Secretariat file 4 September 2025 with CRS and DAC1 data sets and from OECD DAC Explorer / CRS, DAC Press Release DCD(2025)

4. Good practice in EU ODA

Several MS have examples of good practice for ODA budgeting which others can learn from. The first and most important is to meet the 0.7% target while ensuring that resources reach Majority World countries. Others include introducing policy measures to maintain high levels of untied aid and country programmable aid (CPA) or prioritising support for LDCs and FCAs. Long-standing commitments to rights-based approaches, such as gender equality and disability inclusion, are also fundamental.

4.1. Luxembourg

Poverty focus and no ODA inflation

Luxembourg continues to allocate around 1% of GNI to ODA, well above the 0.7% target.[23] Two factors enable this: **the country's long-standing political decision not to count IDRC as ODA,** and ensuring that climate finance remains additional to the core development budget. By providing ODA almost entirely in the form of grants, maintaining 100% untied aid, and strongly prioritising LDCs and FCAs, **Luxembourg safeguards the original meaning of ODA: giving something of value on favourable terms.**

Luxembourg has been able to maintain a concessional, externally-oriented poverty reduction approach, rather than focusing on domestic or geopolitical priorities by committing to the additionality principle. This is underpinned by Luxembourg's commitment to policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD), sustainability checks for legislation and maintaining development objectives. While the OECD peer review praises Luxembourg's strong development focus and protection of ODA integrity, it also highlights the need **to ensure that increasing use of blended finance, innovative finance and private sector engagement remain aligned with sustainable development objectives** and do not gradually dilute core development priorities.

23 See OECD (2025), Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Luxembourg 2025.

4.2. Sweden
A cap on in-donor refugee costs

Sweden has traditionally exceeded the 0.7% ODA/GNI target[24] and ranked third in 2025, behind Norway and Luxembourg.[25] Despite remaining one of the world's largest ODA providers, **recent reductions in overall ODA volumes and in ODA to LDCs in 2025 mark a shift.** Indeed, support to LDCs plummeted by 22% between 2024 and 2025.[26]

One example of Sweden's good practice was its decision to cap IDRC at a maximum of 8% of the total ODA budget, a measure the OECD mid-term peer review described as widely supported and potentially a model for other countries. However, Sweden still counts IDRC as ODA, and CSOs have criticised the rising per-person costs within the capped amount.[27] The 2019 OECD Peer Review[28] and related OECD assessments[29] described Swedish ODA as strongly focused on poverty reduction, human rights, democracy, gender equality, humanitarian principles and sustainable development. However, **the 2023 mid-term review signals growing tensions** and encourages Sweden to ensure poverty-focused ODA, guided by coherent development objectives. **Overall, Sweden illustrates both sides of the coin: it combines relatively high ODA volumes, grants and strong normative priorities, with an increasing shift toward interest-based development cooperation** and reduced support to the most marginalised countries.

24 See also CONCORD (2025), AidWatch 2025 Report, p. 20.

25 See OECD DAC (2026), Preliminary ODA figures, pp. 5, 9.

26 According to CONCORD Sweden's communication with its Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

27 A similar decision has been taken in the Netherlands. After deciding to abandon the long-standing 0.7% ODA/GNI commitment, the Netherlands nevertheless introduced in 2024 an important safeguard for ODA integrity by capping IDRC at 10% of the aid budget from 2027 onwards. This is particularly significant because such costs had exceeded this level for several years (reaching around 17% in 2026, 14% in 2025, 18% in 2024 and 17% in 2023), meaning that the cap helps stabilise the development budget and protect resources for international cooperation. On the downside, however, the Dutch government also decided that non-military support to Ukraine would henceforth be financed directly from the ODA budget rather than from a separate budget. See CONCORD's NL member, https://www.partos.nl/.

28 See OECD (2019), Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Sweden.

29 See OECD (2025), Development Cooperation Profiles: Sweden; OECD (2024), Mid-Term Review Sweden.

4.3. Belgium

A principled approach ...under threat

Belgium is particularly relevant in the debate **because of the structure and orientation of its development cooperation model.** Belgian ODA has traditionally placed strong emphasis on multilateralism, untied aid, humanitarian assistance, social sectors and support to LDCs and FCAS. At the same time, it focused on grants, relying less on large sovereign lending portfolios, PSIs and highly leveraged financial mechanisms than other countries. The OECD peer review highlights Belgium's long-standing support for policy coherence, civil society engagement, gender equality and poverty reduction, as well as its strong use of untied aid and multilateral channels.

Yet this principled approach is under threat. Following the 2024 elections, a 25% cut to the development cooperation budget was announced for 2025–2027, demonstrating how rapidly development-oriented ODA models can come under pressure from domestic budget constraints and shifting political priorities. Moreover, in the new government's policy documents ODA is being reframed as a foreign policy instrument that must defend Belgium's interests. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development cooperation is undergoing a restructuring that could weaken the ODA principles it used to defend. Belgium therefore demonstrates **a relatively strong tradition of ODA quality, which is however, also faced with the broader challenges for EU development cooperation,** where fiscal pressures, geopolitical priorities and migration-related concerns increasingly compete with long-term development objectives.

5. Policy recommendations

ODA plays a unique role: public finance allocated on favourable terms to promote the economic welfare and development of Majority World countries.[30]

Further cuts in **ODA budgets** will reverse decades of progress in health and other essential areas of human development.[31] Similarly, **diverting ODA resources to advance the EU's strategic interests and serve other policy objectives** such as export promotion or migration policy will undermine the trust in the EU's offer for international partnerships. Precisely because ODA is limited, expected to suffer further cuts and increasingly stretched to address an ever-growing list of global challenges,[32] **we call on EU Institutions and MS to:**

1. Uphold the core development mandate and concessionality of ODA.

➔ **Prioritise EU ODA grants and other forms of highly concessional finance for Least Developed Countries and Fragile and Conflict Affected contexts,** where ODA has the greatest potential to reduce inequalities and poverty and where private finance mobilisation is limited.

➔ **Maintain ODA as a distinct flow,** ensuring that private and blended finance complement, rather than replace ODA.

➔ **Lead efforts within the OECD DAC to strengthen the integrity of ODA** by ensuring it is not used to subsidise private investors or Export Credit Agencies (ECAs), and by capping the share channelled through private sector instruments and blending operations.

2. Measure and report poverty- and inequality-focused ODA and adopt binding targets to track progress.

➔ **Report ODA against existing indicators, including ODA to countries with lower Human Development Index (HDI)** scores.

➔ **Adopt and use project level tools** to measure ODA's contribution to reducing poverty and inequalities (EU Inequality Marker, Distributional Impact Assessments, OECD gender equality and disability markers…)

3. Set clear step-by-step plans to reverse the current cuts and to reach funding commitments of at least 0.7% of GNI to ODA and 0.15%–0.2% of GNI to LDCs by 2030.

➔ Increase ODA budgets through **real, programmable financial resources.**

➔ **Explore new sources to mobilise public development finance.**

30 Or partner countries as per OECD DAC official language.

31 See ISGlobal, Global aid cuts could reverse decades of progress in health and development.

32 These include poverty reduction, climate change, migration, pandemics, security and geopolitical stability.

4. Introduce a cap or ceiling on costs inflating EU ODA budgets as a first step towards their gradual exclusion, while ensuring transparent reporting.

➜ Where full exclusion is not possible, **draw on the experience of some MS to introduce ceilings** (e.g: In-donor refugee costs cap in Sweden).

➜ Present real ODA figures by **reporting all inflated ODA categories separately.**

5. Ground EU ODA in Majority World priorities and strengthen democratic ODA governance.

➜ **Support the democratisation of ODA governance, shifting it away from the OECD DAC towards the United Nations.**

➜ **Increase country programmable aid (CPA)**[33] so that a greater share of ODA is predictable and aligned with Majority World countries priorities, while ensuring that humanitarian assistance continues to receive adequate funding.

➜ **Ensure that EU development cooperation initiatives are well coordinated, support local systems, and strengthen partner-country ownership throughout the Team.**

➜ **Strengthen support for locally led development (LLD) and triangular cooperation as approaches that reinforce Majority World countries ownership.** Take inspiration from countries that already implement LLD frameworks.[34]

33 Country Programmable Aid (CPA) is ODA subject to multi-year planning at the country or regional level and over which partner countries could have significant say. See OECD DAC definition.

34 See OECD (2026), Practical Guidelines for Supporting Locally Led Development, p. 29.

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